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Terrorism has become the one of the major threats facing many states. Understanding the 
potential sources of and preventing the financial support of terrorist organizations takes 
an important place in countering terrorism. This thesis focuses on the Kurdistan Workers’ 
Party (PKK) financing activities through the land border of Turkey. In doing so, this 
study mainly examines how the Turkish border security system can stop the trans-border 
financial activities of PKK along its land borders with Iran, Iraq and Syria. This thesis 
also takes the U.S. as a case study in terms of border security measures, and within that 
framework, makes recommendations for safeguarding Turkey’s land borders to prevent 
financial activities of the PKK terrorist organization without affecting free trade and the 
economic flow of services. Presently, the Turkish border security system is fragmented 
and poorly coordinated. Border management is currently split between the army, 
gendarmerie, police and coast guard. Moreover, international and interdepartmental 
collaborations are extremely limited. The prevention of cross-border financial activities 
of the PKK might be accomplished by forming an independent border security agency, 
adopting modern international standards and the latest technological innovations, and 
sustaining international and interdepartmental cooperation. 
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A. THE PURPOSE OF THE THESIS 
The purpose of this thesis is 1) to evaluate the financing activities of the Kurdistan 
Workers’ Party (PKK) through the land border of Turkey and 2) to examine the U.S. as a 
case study in terms of border security measures, and within that framework, 3) to make 
recommendations for safeguarding Turkey’s land borders to prevent the financial 
activities of the PKK terrorist organization without affecting free trade and the economic 
flow of services. 
The PKK, founded in November 27, 1978, was described in a 2010 Europol 
report as an “ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorist group seeking international 
recognition and political self-determination.”1 In addition, it is recognized as a terrorist 
organization by U.S. and European Union (EU) laws.2 Being active for more than 30 
years, PKK has been a part of the violence in Turkey during that period, and it has cost at 
least 30,000 lives on both sides.3 According to Jeanne K. Giraldo and Harold A. 
Trinkunas, terrorist organizations such as the PKK require financial resources to survive, 
and countering the financial substructure of the terrorist unit is the key to overthrowing 
the terrorist threat completely.4 This study focuses primarily on the financial structure of 
a specific terrorist organization, the PKK, and how to counter the financial support of this 
organization by means of strengthened borders. In addition, this thesis studies the  
 
 
                                                 
1 Mitchel P. Roth and Murat Sever, “Cutting off the Hand that Feeds it: Countering Terrorist-
Financing in the 21st Century,” International Journal of Security and Terrorism 1, no. 1 (2010): 59–77, 69; 
TESAT Europol, “Report (2010),” EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report [Electronic Resource], TE-
SAT 2010.   
2 Sedat Laciner, “The West and Terrorism: PKK as A Privileged Terrorist Organization,” Turkish 
Weekly 14 (2006); Mitchel P. Roth and Murat Sever, “The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) as Criminal 
Syndicate: Funding Terrorism through Organized Crime, A Case Study,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 
30, no. 10 (2007): 901–920. 
3 Michael Radu, “The Rise and Fall of the PKK,” Orbis 45, no. 1 (2001): 47–63. 
4 Jeanne K. Giraldo and Harold A. Trinkunas, Terrorism Financing and State Response: A 
Comparative Perspective (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), 21–22, 365. 
 2 
effectiveness of Turkey’s border security progress in preventing transnational crime and 
Turkey’s effectiveness at participating in provincial collaboration for prevention of illegal 
trafficking. 
B. IMPORTANCE OF THE THESIS 
Since the adoption of the United Nations International Convention for the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism in 1999, financing has become a critical issue 
in the countering terrorism. Michael Freeman argues that terrorism funding methods can 
be collected under four main categories: state sponsorship, popular support, illegal 
activities and legal activities.5 Although there are some states, such as Syria and Iran, that 
continue to finance terrorism, most countries have generally stopped financing terrorist 
organizations since the end of the Cold War. This strategic shift led terrorist 
organizations to find financial support on their own. As Giraldo and Trinkunas posit, 
“The end of the Cold War and globalization have accelerated and facilitated the 
diversification of the terrorist funding portfolio.”6 As a result, terrorist organizations have 
started to derive the majority of their income mostly from lucrative illegal activities. 
Second, since I will study the relation between border security and terrorism 
financing activities, the PKK serves as a good example because of its cross-border 
activities. The settlement of the organization has been along the crossroads and borders of 
Iraq, Iran and Syria. It conducts its activities within these three states as well as Turkey. 
The PKK has been manipulating Turkey’s geopolitical and geostrategic location for 
terrorist and organized criminal activities. Situated at the crossroads of Asia, the Middle 
East and Europe, Turkey gives the PKK access to 5,000 miles of coastline.7 From this 
perspective, Turkey’s eastern and southeastern borders have been the key element of the 
PKK’s financial activities, particularly illegal ones. Following the intervention of the  
 
                                                 
5 Michael Freeman, Financing Terrorism: Case Studies (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2012), 237.  
6 Giraldo and Trinkunas, Terrorism Financing and State Responses: A Comparative Perspective, 365, 
19. 
7 Roth and Sever, “The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) as Criminal Syndicate: Funding Terrorism 
through Organized Crime, A Case Study,” 906–907. 
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United States in Iraq in 2003, the PKK took advantage of the turmoil in the south to open 
new camps in the Kandil Mountains and manage its illegal financial activities around 
these borders. 
Third, even though the fight against PKK terrorism has been conducted for more 
than30 years, its efforts to gain income could not be prevented until now. This means a 
new approach is necessary in countering sources of financial support for the PKK. 
According to Alexander Bligh, recent terrorist activities have highlighted the need to 
share intelligence and to create a comprehensive framework to combat terror financing.8 
Thus, it is important to lay out the problems of Turkey’s Southeast border in terms of 
PKK’s financing activities. Besides, in this technologically-organized new century, it is 
crucial to point out the challenges in countering terrorist financing in Turkey’s Southeast 
land border in order to strengthen Turkey’s frontiers. By doing so, this study seeks to 
help Turkey adopt a new approach to border protection. This new approach suggests that 
traditional security practices along the borders should be innovatively fitted to modern 
international standards and new technological developments. In this way, it will be more 
effective in combatting the financing activities of the PKK along the borders. The study 
concludes with strategic-level policy recommendations on border security by examining 
the U.S. case. 
The study also suggests that a civilian, non-military, professional single body be 
established to oversee border management, including surveillance of borders and checks 
at all border gates. In doing so, Turkey should produce an action plan to create the basis 
of the border management reform and determine the legal and institutional 
improvements, training activities and infrastructure and equipment investments required. 
In addition, these recommendations provide Turkish politicians and security authorities 
with a proposal to expand collaboration and effectiveness for border-related issues. This 
thesis seeks to raise awareness among relevant departments, which is the first step in 
implementing desired changes that will eventually enhance Turkey’s land borders. 
                                                 
8 Alexander Bligh, “Developing Intelligence in the Field of Financing Terror—An Analytical Model 
of Anti-Terror Inter Agency and Cross Border Cooperation: The Security of Financial Systems Dimension” 
Academic Conferences International Limited, July 2011. 
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C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESIS 
The considerable length of Turkey’s land borders with Iran, Iraq and Syria make 
it hard to control them efficiently. And the PKK terrorist organization has been taking 
advantage of these long borders. Most of the PKK’s terrorism funding activities is related 
to these border activities. Furthermore, the people living in these border areas make 
money from different types of cross-border activities. An uncontrolled border line 
threatens the national security of Turkey especially in terms of PKK’s funding activities. 
As John L. Lombardini and David J. Sanchez assert, instability and ineffectiveness of 
legal and governmental organizations provide safe havens for terrorists, arms/drug 
smugglers and money launderers like those in the Tri-Border Area (widely known as the 
Triple Frontier between Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay) of South America.9  
It has been commonly suggested that globalization has harmed the sovereignty of 
states and it made borders more open and vulnerable to any kind of threat. Thus, states 
more than ever seek to protect themselves from external threats and ensure that their 
borders are more secure than ever. Nonetheless, there are many advantages to soft 
borders, such as establishing good relations with neighboring states, sustaining border 
regions’ economic prosperity and contributing to open and free market economies. So, 
the level of border security matters at this point. The balance between economic 
wellbeing and the security of the motherland should be considered very carefully in terms 
of countering finances of terrorism. 
Some scholars, such as Murat Sever and Mitchel P. Roth, suggest that 
international cooperation between law enforcement agencies can achieve the same result 
perform the same function. They state that the United States should play a bigger role in 
bringing Turkey and the EU together to combat the financial activities of the PKK.10 
These suggestions, however, fall short in offering a coherent strategy to reduce the 
terrorism financing activities of PKK. Michael Freeman argues that terrorist 
                                                 
9 John L. Lombardini and David J. Sanchez, “Terrorist Financing and the Tri-Border Area of South 
America,” in Terrorism Financing and State Responses: A Comparative Perspective, eds. Jeanne K. 
Giraldo and Harold A. Trinkunas (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), 231–246. 
10 Roth and Sever, Cutting off the Hand that Feeds it: Countering Terrorist-Financing in the 21st 
Century, 59–77, 70. 
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organizations consider the following six concerns in picking a financing means: quantity, 
legitimacy, security, reliability, control and simplicity. These criteria make one potential 
source of income more attractive than others for terrorist organizations.11 PKK’s 
financing methods include most of these criteria in terms of cross-border activities. In this 
study, the author hypothesizes that there is a strong relationship between the strength of 
border security and the ability to reduce terrorism financing activities of the PKK. The 
author also hypothesizes that international cooperation and the use of UAVs (Unmanned 
Aerial Systems) as border security measures are the best methods to reduce such 
activities of the PKK. The key objective of this thesis is to find out what the correlation is 
between border security and the financing activities of the PKK. Although there are many 
studies examining the financing methods of the PKK, the characteristic properties of each 
method are not analyzed in depth. Therefore, the author will try to fill this gap by 
demonstrating that the PKK is mainly financing its activities by using the Turkish land 
border, and so, strengthening borders can help combat the financing activities of the 
PKK. In other words, In other words, stronger borders can choke the flow of PKK 
funding from external sources. 
First, all kinds of smuggling activities, especially drug smuggling, have been an 
important financing activity for PKK. Turkey’s long and geographically tough land 
border makes it hard to control the border effectively. These uncontrolled border areas 
facilitate PKK control in the region and simplify smuggling, thereby leading the PKK to 
shift its financing activities to the border area. Freeman explains the simplicity criteria 
with these words: “Methods that require fewer specialized skills, that require as little 
effort as possible, that have simpler processes, and that have fewer inherent costs will be 
more desirable than other methods.” Moreover, the control criteria play an important role 
in terms of cross-border activities. By using border areas, terrorist organizations collect 
the revenues in one hand and centralize the funding activities. This centralization gives 
rise to more control over sub-units. Lastly, the reliability criteria influence the PKK’s 
decision to head towards the border area. As Freeman has noted, predictable and 
                                                 
11 Michael Freeman, “The Sources of Terrorist Financing: Theory and Typology,” Studies in Conflict 
& Terrorism 34, no. 6 (June 2011): 461–475, 463, doi:10.1080/1057610X.2011.571193. 
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consistent sources are better for terrorist groups. For example, PKK takes advantage of 
being located along a traffic route of heroine which is a reliable revenue stream.12 
Therefore, we assume that sustaining the security of the border will halt the main 
financing activities of PKK. Disrupting the financial activities of the PKK terrorist 
organization will not only obstruct the launch of terrorist attacks, but it will also harm the 
capabilities of terrorist organizations. 
Second, the financing system of terrorist organizations has different phases. 
Funding methods form only one segment of the complete financing cycle. At the same 
time, terrorist organizations move the money they earn and eventually spend or store their 
income. At this point, there is another relation between PKK financing activities through 
Turkey’s land border. The PKK spends most of its income along with the cross-border 
activities. Weapons and ammunition purchases, as well as organizational and living 
expenses form a significant part of the expenditures of the organization. Since the 
estimated 1,500 terrorists inside Turkey’s border have been transferred from Iraq, Iran 
and Syria through land borders, the money follows the same path in order to sustain of 
the lives of these terrorists inside Turkey. Thus, it is hard to stop the financing of 
terrorists inside Turkey without first securing its borders. 
Third, the author seeks to explore which border issues of different countries might 
include good lessons for Turkey, especially in regard to terrorism financing activities. 
Illegal cross-border activity is a major homeland defense and security problem along 
Turkey’s southeast border just as it is along the southwestern border of the United States. 
The former Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano 
announced in 2010 that UAV flights would begin along the Mexican border.13 In 
addition, authorities in the United States and Canada made an agreement on dealing with 
deterrence and detection of security threats along the U.S.-Canada border. The author 
expects that different countries’ experiences and methods will shed light on Turkey’s 
struggle to combat terrorist financing activities by strengthening border security. In 
                                                 
12 Ibid., 464.  
13 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Progress in Implementing New Security Measures along 
the Southwest Border,” accessed June 10, 2013, http://www.dhs.gov/news/2010/08/30/progress-
implementing-new-security-measures-along-southwest-border. 
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addition, the author believes the case study of Turkey’s land border would be a model for 
other countries that have been suffering from similar terrorist activities through their 
borders. Moreover, the author suggests that, in order to sustain a more secure border, 
Turkey should persuade friendly countries (including the United States) and international 
organizations such as the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, United Nations and the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to analyze the region along the border and 
reform the security system of borders in accordance with global needs. By doing so, the 
author hopes his conclusions could be generalized so that other countries can draw from 
them. 
D. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
The thesis relies on the comparative case study method, which uses the United 
States as a comparative case in order to evaluate the characteristics, general principles, 
practices and agencies of border-protection in Turkey. In doing so, our main focus will be 
on the financing methods of the PKK through transnational activities. Having established 
a complete picture of the current state of the PKK’s cross-border financing activities, the 
author will focus on U.S. border protection measures. The main sources that the thesis 
relies on are theoretical and secondary reading materials from the Dudley Knox Library 
of the Naval Postgraduate School, information from the International Center for 
Terrorism and Transnational Crime of Turkish National Police Academy, available 
printed materials from Turkey’s government departments and materials from the 
electronic sources of Worldcat and Pro-Quest. In regard to border security of the U.S., 
data and information provided from news reports, journal articles, official U.S. 
government and Congressional documents, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
and other agencies. 
E. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This section explores the literature on terrorism financing and border security, 
individually and in combination, in order to give insight into the framework of the 
analysis of the topic. As Friedrich G. Schneider has posited, the literature review should 
meet two points: “to widen the knowledge of this subject and the understanding of the 
 8 
main issues under debate and to focus on the literature closely related to the research 
topic.”14 In light of his observation, the content of the material relevant to this study 
contains numerous studies, reports and literature produced in the form of government 
reports, journal articles and scholarly books. 
1. Terrorism Financing 
Terrorism financing (TF) has been studied academically at least since the 
1970s.15 First and foremost, terrorist organizations need money, because as Freeman 
states, “terrorism costs money.”16 Similarly, more complicated and systematic 
organizations need funding sources in order to finance their activities. In fact, Roth and 
Sever claim that “terrorist groups need money above all else.”17 Like everyone else, 
terrorists need money for different reasons. A recent study conducted by Steve Kiser 
reveals the importance of money for terrorist organizations. In his research he 
interviewed “28 people including various analysts, professors and policymakers, 17 rated 
money as ‘highly important,’ eight rated money as ‘somewhat important,’ while only 
three rated money as ‘not very important’ for a global terrorist organization to 
function.”18 A terrorist organization not only gains money from different sources but also 
learns how to manage this money. As James Adams indicates, “good financial planning 
means having enough cash to buy and keep support, to pay for arms, and to build a 
propaganda base among the people the organization claims to represent.”19 Meanwhile, 
the financial body of terrorist activity has been one of the key areas of study for 
                                                 
14 Friedrich G. Schneider, The (Hidden) Financial Flows of Terrorist and Organized Crime 
Organizations: A Literature Review and some Preliminary Empirical Results (Rochester: Rochester, 2010), 
4, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1584191. 
15 Roth and Sever, Cutting off the Hand that Feeds it: Countering Terrorist-Financing in the 21st 
Century, 60. 
16 Freeman, The Sources of Terrorist Financing: Theory and Typology, 461–475. 
17 Roth and Sever, Cutting off the Hand that Feeds It: Countering Terrorist-Financing in the 21st 
Century, 61. 
18 Steve Kiser, Financing Terror: An Analysis of Simulation to Affect Al Qaeda’s Financial 
Infrastructures (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2005), 4. 
19 James Adams, The Financing of Terror (London: New English Lib, 1986), 293, 238. 
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understanding terrorism. Bligh argues. “one of the major, yet understudied, dimensions of 
the analysis of terrorist activity, and the ways to counter it, is the financial dimension.”20 
In one such study, Nikos Passas states that terrorist fundraising is rarely 
innovative and mostly relies on the same kind of sources.21 As indicated earlier there are 
four general financing methods for terrorism: state sponsorship, popular support, illegal 
activities and legal activities. First, state sponsorship can be defined as government 
support of paramilitary groups or organizations engaged in terrorism. The support of Iran 
and Syria to Hezbollah can be a good example of state sponsorship. Besides Indian 
support for the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE - Sri Lanka) and Soviet support 
of the National Liberation Army (Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional - ELN - Colombia)  are 
other examples of this type.22 According to Kiser, “[the] state sponsor of terrorism list 
includes seven states: Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria.”23 The 
second group, illegal activities, has a wide range and can be defined as smuggling, drug 
trafficking, kidnapping and ransom, etc. These methods have been used by almost all 
terrorist organizations as a funding method. Drugs in particular have been a lucrative 
business for terrorist groups like the PKK, The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia 
(FARC), ELN, and the Loyalists. For example, FARC allegedly earns $500 million per 
year from the drug trade alone. On the other hand, Hezbollah and LTTE use theft, 
counterfeiting and fraud in order to finance their operations. The third form is popular 
support, which is widely seen under the cover of charities and donations. It can be briefly 
defined as support of a sympathetic population or constituency. Al-Qaeda and Hamas are 
the foremost groups using this method.24 In addition to Hezbollah, the PKK and the 
                                                 
20 Alexander Bligh, “Developing Intelligence in the Field of Financing Terror—An Analytical Model 
of Anti-Terror Inter Agency and Cross Border Cooperation: The Security of Financial Systems Dimension” 
Academic Conferences International Limited, July 2011), 31.   
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and State Responses: A Comparative Perspective, eds. Jeanne K. Giraldo and Harold A. Trinkunas 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), 24. 
22 Freeman, Financing Terrorism: Case Studies, 237. 
23 Kiser, Financing Terror: An Analysis of Simulation to Affect Al Qaeda’s Financial Infrastructures, 
110. 
24 Ibid., 26; Roth and Sever, Cutting off the Hand that Feeds it: Countering Terrorist-Financing in the 
21st Century, 66. 
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LTTE are well-known groups that collect money from their ethnic and religious 
Diasporas around the world under the guise of “donations.” The last one, legal activities, 
is another type of terrorism financing method that operates under the cover of legal 
enterprises. For example, the Loyalists manage different types of legitimate businesses, 
such as drinking clubs, security firms and taxi firms to provide revenue to their 
movement.25 
2. Border Security 
Securing borders has been a top priority of most states in the twenty-first century. 
According to an action plan prepared by the European Union, the main causes of trans-
border activities include “worldwide developments, economic disparities and domestic 
warfare, heavy economic difficulties and hunger, general scarcity of food and epidemic 
diseases dissident by movements, regional crisis, the pressures by undemocratic 
administrations or their citizens, aspiration for better standards, widespread human rights 
violations.”26 John Antal stresses the same point with regard to the changing structure of 
trans-border activities. According to Antal today threats to borders come not only from 
conventional attacks by enemy armies, but also from contemporary conflicts such as 
illegal immigration, smuggling, drug trafficking, criminal activities and mainly 
terrorism.27 There are certain challenges in securing borders, as several academics have 
noted. As Judith A. Warner points out, making the borders both loose enough to allow 
citizens to pass and, at the same time, strict enough to stop smuggling of people and 
drugs is challenging and counterbalancing. It is hard to overcome and manage this 
tradeoff and establish border security.28 Some other scholars emphasize cooperation in 
preventing the trans-border activities. According to Nilufer Karacasulu, with terrorism 
                                                 
25 Freeman, Financing Terrorism: Case Studies, 237–238; Patricia Rodriguez-Rey, A Balancing Act: 
Anti-Terror Financing Guidelines and their Effects on Islamic Charities (Monterey, CA: Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2006), 85, 22–24. 
26 “Towards the Implementation of Turkey’s Integrated Border Management Strategy.” Abstract. 
European Union Project; Project Number: TR0204.01, no. National Action Plan (2002). 
27 John Antal, “Border Battles: The Future of Border Security Technology Along the US–Mexican 
Border,” Military Technology 34, no. 11 (2010): 53–62. 
28 Judith A. Warner, United States Border Security: A Reference Handbook (Santa Barbara, CA: 
ABC-CLIO, 2010), 3. 
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being more challenging with globalization, the traditional security perception of national 
borders is not capable of recognizing new threats that exceed the national borders. 
Terrorism in the twenty-first century entails cooperation for security.29 In fact, Kolinda 
Grabar-Kitarovic emphasizes a similar point. According to her, since threat perceptions 
are changing due to the extraterritorial nature of globalized problems, traditional security 
threats are being reconsidered, thus redefining the concept of security by means of not 
only geopolitical, but also economic, social and other considerations. She also argues that 
global primacy makes the United States more susceptible to the trans-border threat.30 
:Similarly, Loretta Napoleoni argues that counter-terrorism measures are becoming 
ineffective thanks to globalization. She gives the example of Youssef Nada, a terrorist 
financer banned from traveling by the UN, who was able to liquidate his enterprises and 
pass the Swiss border undetected several times.31 Actually, Jason Ackleson points out 
this dilemma: on one hand, sustaining the economic growth and sociocultural ties of the 
border regions is essential, while on the other hand, applying enhanced security measures 
at borders against the threats of terrorism and transnational criminal activity are equally 
important.32 To conclude, while some implementations support the idea of strict and old-
fashioned border policy in spite of the increasing interaction among nations, some 
scholars argue that there is a growing necessity for reorganization of the border security 
system considering the realities of globalization. 
Furthermore, monitoring borders and sustaining border security requires a 
coherent strategy, significant manpower and current technology. According to Antal, the 
tactical measures can be to see the border, then analyze the activity along the border and 
capture the infiltrators. New technologies, such as UAVs, should be used in addition to 
                                                 
29 Nilufer Karacasulu, “Security and Globalization in the Context of International Terrorism,” 
Uluslararasi Hukuk Ve Politika 2, no. 5 (2006): 1–17. 
30 Kolinda Grabar-Kitarovic, “American Primacy and the Consequences of Globalization: Building 
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Medunarodne Studije 1, no. 4 (Jan 2001): 42–61. 
31 Loretta Napoleoni, “Terrosim Financing in Europe,” in Terrorism Financing and State Responses: 
A Comparative Perspective, eds. Jeanne K. Giraldo and Harold A. Trinkunas (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2007), 178. 
32 Jason Ackleson, “Border Security Technologies: Local and Regional Implications,” Review of 
Policy Research 22, no. 2 (Mar 2005), 150. 
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traditional ones such as fences and patrols.33 Moreover, according to their action plan, 
the EU brings a new approach to the contemporary border security structure. According 
to this plan, governments shall establish a single civilian and professional organization to 
prepare the institutional and legislative reforms in order to perform the tasks of control 
and surveillance of borders more effectively.34 
3. Terrorism Financing and Border Security 
Bligh suggests that “a significant proportion of the funds used directly or 
indirectly for terror purposes are transmitted through informal channels.”35 What are 
these informal channels, and how is it possible to transfer money in the age of 
globalization? Globalization made borders more open and vulnerable to any kind of 
threat. When it comes to the illegal trans-border activities, states tend to take more 
precautions in order to prevent these kinds of activities. However, there are different 
opinions about the impact of the strength of the measures along the borders. If there is a 
weak government and loose border, security measures should be increased. Thomas H. 
Johnson notes that international resources have been required to secure Afghanistan to 
eliminate the manufacturing and transporting of opium.36 As Roth and Sever argue, 
transitional and developing countries are the most profitable location for illegal 
businesses for organized crime and terrorism.37 According to statements of arrested PKK 
members, the PKK formed checkpoints on the Iranian side of the Turkish-Iran border in 
order to tax smuggled items and provide guidance and courier services to traffickers.38 
By contrast, Israel adopted a stricter border policy during the Intifada. The Israeli 
                                                 
33 Antal, Border Battles: The Future of Border Security Technology Along the US-Mexican Border, 
54. 
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government introduced innovative technologies to inspect the movement of cargo and the 
entry/exit of individuals across the borders. 
Criminal activities, particularly cross-border activities like smuggling and various 
types of trafficking have been important for terrorist financing. According the report 
titled “Global Overview of Narcotics-Funded Terrorist and Other Extremist Groups,” as a 
result of the decline in funding by state sponsors, terrorist groups have become 
increasingly reliant on drug trafficking as a main financing source. Drugs have been an 
important source of money for different terrorist groups such as the PKK, FARC, and the 
Loyalists. As indicated earlier, FARC allegedly earns $500 million per year from the 
drug trade. According to Turkey’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs Internet site, some of the 
PKK’s funding methods include drug trafficking, arms smuggling and trafficking in 
human beings. Furthermore, according to a report released by the Turkish National Police 
Department of Anti-Smuggling and Organized Crime, 365 different drug investigations 
linked to the PKK were conducted between 1984 and 2011.   
In addition, there is a strong relationship between TF activities, particularly drug 
smuggling and border issues. As Schneider indicates in the “Global Overview of 
Narcotics-Funded Terrorist and Other Extremist Groups,” there is a relationship between 
terrorist groups and narcotics trafficking in the Latin American Tri-Border Region 
(Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay), Colombia, and Peru.39 These land borders and the 
disputes among countries over these borders facilitate the terrorist organizations’ 
smuggling activities. As Lombardini and Sanchez emphasize, permissive environments 
like the Tri-Border area can facilitate TF activities.40 Lack of authority along the border 
gives rise to illegal activities. In response to problems along the borders countries have 
been forced to take extra measures. After 9/11, the U.S. Border Patrol developed its 2004 
strategy for preventing terrorist weapons from entering the country, which became the 
agency’s new priority mission.41 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), 
                                                 
39 Schneider, The (Hidden) Financial Flows of Terrorist and Organized Crime Organizations: A 
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created as the largest investigative arm of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) in 2003, is “uniquely positioned to impact the ability of terrorists and other 
criminal organizations to earn, move and store their illicit proceeds.”42 Moreover, in 
order to stop cross-border terrorism financing activities, Canada’s Parliament legislated 
new anti-terrorism laws which cut off sources of financing for terrorists. Related to this 
law, Canadian Citizenship and Immigration Minister Elinor Caplan and U.S. Attorney 
General John Ashcroft signed an agreement dealing with deterrence and detection of 
security threats along the borders.43 
Lastly, there are different safe havens in different continents for terrorists. A safe 
haven can be defined as an ungoverned or ill-governed area of a country where terrorists 
that constitute a threat are able to organize their activities. Perhaps the most well-known 
example of a safe haven has been the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan’s 
Northwest Frontier Province and Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Others include the 
Trans-Sahara region of North and Northwest Africa for Salafist groups; Somalia, a failed 
state which lacks a functioning central government; the Caucus, the border surrounding 
Chechnya, Dagestan, North Ossetia, and neighboring areas; and in the Tri-Border region 
of South America, especially for supporters of Islamic terrorist groups, such as Hezbollah 
and Hamas. In all these relatively ungoverned areas, terrorist groups take advantage of 
loosely regulated territory.44 
F. STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
This thesis consists of six chapters: 
Chapter I includes the purpose, problem statement and hypothesis of the study, 
the literature review and the proposed importance of the thesis. Moreover, the major 
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research methodology and sources are mentioned here. Lastly, the thesis overview 
comprises the last part of the first chapter. 
Chapter II reviews the definition and background of terrorism and related terms. 
In order to make the reader familiar with the terminology, the chapter also reviews the 
historical background of terrorism as well as the different definitions of it. After an 
introduction to the field, the chapter proceeds with the analysis of the PKK terrorist 
organization and its financial activities. The main emphasis is on the trans-border 
financing activities of the PKK. The chapter concludes by examining PKK financing 
along Turkey’s land border under three dimensions: moving, earning, and storing. 
Through this examination, the author seeks to demonstrate the importance of stronger 
borders by explaining the relationship between lax border security and TF. 
Chapter III discusses the historical background and the current situation of the 
border-protection system of Turkey. It outlines the traditions of Turkey’s Border Policy, 
the state departments related to border protection service and the current situation of the 
borders with Iran, Syria and Iraq. The chapter also mentions the socio-economic and 
historic problems of the frontier territory and draws attention to this aspect of the region, 
which must be considered in the case of border security reform. 
Chapter IV argues different perspectives on improving the efficiency of the 
border protection of Turkey. It examines the United States as the case study in terms of 
its national border security system. The practices of this country are then compared to 
Turkey’s border security system and its implementation. Then, the chapter continues with 
various perspectives on improving the effectiveness of Turkey’s border protection in 
terms of fighting financing activities of the PKK by examining the case country, 
especially what it has done so far in order to prevent terrorism financing activities after 
9/11. The U.S. case suggests that developed democracies have an established and 
separate institution with specific coordinating functions to promote their efforts to 
enhance border security. 
Chapter V summarizes the objectives and argument of the thesis and suggests 
recommendations that comply with the findings of the four previous chapters to increase 
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the effectiveness of the border security system of Turkey in meeting its goal to halt the 
cross-border TF activities of the PKK.  
Chapter VI wraps up the entire study and emphasizes again the importance of the 
thesis to the field by laying out the correlation between the border security and terrorism 
financing. It asserts the finding of the study and makes broader recommendations 
regarding the border security. 
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II. TERRORISM, TERRORISM FINANCING AND THE PKK 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Author Audrey Kurth Cronin starts her book with this question, “Terrorist 
campaigns may seem endless, but they always end. Why?”45 Terrorism has become one 
of the most important political and sociological phenomena of our age. Terrorist 
organizations can accomplish the most brutal deeds with the help of technological 
improvements and globalization in order to achieve their goal.46 Such activities are 
expensive to launch, and so it is almost impossible for a crime organization to survive 
without a reliable funding mechanism. Thus, as Richard J. DiGiacomo asserts, “An 
essential component of defeating terrorists is targeting their financing and fundraising 
mechanisms.”47 The first part of the chapter describes terrorism in general as a term, and 
then we will focus on the TF mechanisms. Then, our discussion focuses on the PKK 
terrorist organization and its financing activities. Finally, we discuss the mains arguments 
related to and the implications of the PKK as it relates to the field of TF. 
B. TERRORISM 
Terrorism, which comes etymologically from the Latin word terror, has different 
definitions, and as Walter Laqueur indicates, it is hard to define the term exactly.48  A 
terrorist action was defined in a report to the Congress as:  
The calculated use of unexpected, shocking, and unlawful violence against 
non-combatants (including, in addition to civilians, off-duty military and 
security personnel in peaceful situations) and other symbolic targets 
perpetrated by clandestine members of a subnational group or a 
clandestine agent(s) for the psychological purpose of publicizing a 
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political or religious cause and/or intimidating or coercing a 
government(s) or civilian population into accepting demands on behalf of 
the cause.49 
Terrorism is just one sort of political violence that could emerge in a state.50 The 
definition of terrorism changes from country to country. Some violence that might be 
regarded in the U.S. as an act of terrorism might not be called a terrorist act in another 
country. As Laqueur has observed, “Terrorism is violence but not every form of violence 
is terrorism.”51 At this point, the definition of the terms violence and political violence 
gain importance. Paul Wilkinson defines violence as “the illegitimate use or threatened 
use of coercing resulting, or indeed to result in, death, injury, restraint or intimidation of 
persons or the destruction or seizure of property.”52 Moreover he claims that political 
violence occurs either intentionally by causing any type of injury or damage to body for 
political ends or occurs inadvertently during a political conflict.53 According to the U.S. 
Department of State, the definition of terrorism is “premeditated, politically motivated 
violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine 
agents, usually intended to influence an audience.”54 The term violence comes to the 
forefront in this definition. Violence is the main characteristic of any kind of terrorism 
because it is a tool for terrorism. For this reason, terrorist violence is neither senseless nor 
random.55 Even so, Wilkinson claims that terrorism does not necessarily have to be 
politically motivated. He argues that the term terrorism has been used to refer to 
politically motivated terrorism, but still there are other forms of terrorism.56 He defines 
politically motivated terrorism as “the systematic use of murder and destruction, and the 
                                                 
49 Rex A. Hudson and Marilyn Majeska, “The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who Becomes 
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threat of murder and destruction in order to terrorize individuals, groups, communities or 
governments into conceding to the terrorists’ political demands.”57  In this study just the 
term terrorism will be used instead of politically motivated terrorism. As such, we adopt 
Cindy Combs’ point of view that terrorism is “propaganda by the deed.”58 Although 
there are certain common characteristics of terrorist groups and terrorism, it is still hard 
to profile terrorism in general.59 
Wilkinson separates terrorism into three main types: repressive terrorism, sub-
revolutionary terrorism and revolutionary terrorism. A fourth type, epiphenomenal terror, 
may be cited, but it happens mainly in extraordinary situations such as international or 
civil wars. The first type is used by governments to suppress specific groups or 
individuals; the second type can be used for different purposes such as intimidation, 
revenge or punishment. The last one is long-term terrorism which has political objectives. 
The last two types, revolutionary and sub-revolutionary movements, describe mostly 
today’s terrorist activities.60 There are different objectives for a terrorist movement. Gus 
Martin explains the typical objectives of terrorism as: 
• Changing the existing order 
• Social Disruption 
• Psychological Disruption 
• Creating a Revolutionary environment.61 
On the other hand, according to Martin, the new terrorism has changed its 
objectives. Attracting attention, undermining economies, asserting religious reasons, and 
affecting enemies have become the new objectives of terrorism.62 
Although it has been said that the history of terrorism is as old as the history of 
humanity, the academic research on the subject of terrorism began in the 1970s.63 In light 
                                                 
57 Ibid., 51.   
58 Cindy C. Combs, Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century (New Jersey, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2006), 
153. 
59 Laqueur, The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction, 36–40. 
60 Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State, 57–58. 
61 Martin, Essentials of Terrorism: Concepts and Controversies, 198. 
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of this fact, terrorism as a major topic has been a very fresh field for academic studies. 
There are different types of terrorist movements, such as left-wing and right-wing 
terrorists, nationalist, separatist, irredentist, ethnic, religious motivated, etc. The issue 
was profoundly focused on left-wing terrorism in the late 1960s and early 1970s. After 
1990, the field has started to heavily emphasize religiously motivated terrorism.64 Having 
provided a frame of reference on terrorism, now we will move on with financing 
discussion of how these various types of terrorists obtain funding.  
C. TERRORISM FINANCING AND PRINCIPAL METHODS 
As Rachel Ehrenfeld observes today’s terrorist organizations need money not only 
for funding individual attacks but also for sustaining the continuity of the organization. 
According to Ehrenfeld, terror groups need funding for:  
• Recruitment 
• Training camps and bases 
• Housing and food 
• Equipment, explosives, and conventional and unconventional weapons 
• Forged identity and travel documents 
• Intelligence gathering 
• Communications among organizational components 
• Bribery 
• Day-to-day maintenance expenses of members awaiting commands to 
launch operations.65 
Similarly, Freeman emphasizes this point. These organizations need money 
because they have expenses. First of all, these groups allocate money to recruit new 
terrorists. They also need money for sustaining the daily lives of their members. In 
addition to some basic expenses such as training, feeding and housing of the members, 
terrorist organizations have to equip the members with the explosives and the guns for 
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implementing their goals. Furthermore, their expenses include payments to veteran 
families, bribes for officials, purchase of technological devices, etc. As a result, they have 
to organize their income and manage their budget in order to maintain continuity of the 
organization.66 
Ehrenfeld chooses not to categorize the funding mechanism of terrorist groups. 
According to her, “Funding sources for terrorism are: 
• Governments such as Saudi Arabia and Iran 
• Charitable organizations such as the Muslim World League and the 
International Islamic Relief Organization  
• Legitimate businesses operating as fronts 
• The exploitation of financial markets, especially the unregulated 
commodity markets 
• International trade, which converts cash into precious commodities such as 
diamonds and gold 




• Prostitution rings and trafficking in people 
• Credit card fraud identity theft and counterfeiting. 
• Pirating of videos, compact discs tapes, and software”67 
To combat TF, The International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing 
of Terrorism was adopted by the UN General Assembly in on December 9, 1999. 
According to the act, TF “directly or indirectly, unlawfully and willfully, provides or 
collects funds with the intention that they should be used or in the knowledge that they 
are to be used, in full or in part, in order to carry out”:  
• An act which constitutes an offence under one of the previous nine 
‘sectorial’ conventions listed in the annex to the Convention (from The  
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Hague Convention of 1970 for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of 
Aircraft to the 1997 International Convention for the Suppression of 
Terrorist Bombings); or  
• Any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, 
or any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation 
of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is 
to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international 
organization to do or to abstain from doing any act” (article 2, paragraph 
1).68 As one can understood from this broad definition, TF activities were 
criminalized by this UN Convention in 1999. With this overview of TF, 
we will now introduce the PKK case and it TF methods in the following 
section. 
D. THE PKK AND TERRORISM FINANCING 
1. The PKK: Roots and Cost 
This section focuses on the PKK terrorist organization and its financing activities. 
The PKK, founded in November 27, 1978, was described in a 2010 Europol report as an 
“ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorist group seeking international recognition and 
political self-determination.”69 Moreover, it is recognized as a terrorist organization by 
U.S. and EU laws.70 Being active for more than 30 years, the PKK has been the part of 
the violence in Turkey during that time, costing at least 3,000 lives on both sides.71 The 
organization’s leader, Abdullah Ocalan, was captured in Kenya in 1999, brought to 
Turkey, and sentenced to life imprisonment after trial. According to a recently released 
report by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, the exact cost of PKK terrorism to 
Turkey between 1984 and 2012 has been calculated as follows: 
 
 
                                                 
68 Pierre Klein, “International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism,” United 
Nations Audiovisual Library of International Law, (2009), 1–2, 
http://Untreaty.Un.Org/Cod/Avl/Pdf/Ha/Icsft/Icsft_e.Pdf. 
69 Roth and Sever, Cutting off the Hand that Feeds it: Countering Terrorist-Financing in the 21st 
Century, 69; Europol report. 
70 Laciner, The West and Terrorism: PKK as A Privileged Terrorist Organization; Roth and Sever, 
“The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) as Criminal Syndicate: Funding Terrorism through Organized Crime, 
A Case Study,” 901–902. 
71 Radu, The Rise and Fall of the PKK, 47–63. 
 23 
• 7918 government employees killed 
• 22,101 PKK militants killed 
• 5,557 civilian casualties  
The number of executions within the PKK remains unknown. However, it has 
been estimated that the PKK has been responsible for approximately 2,000 to 17,000 
assassinations. In total 35,576 people have died in Turkey because of terrorism 
(excluding the off-statistics numbers).72 
2. Financing Methods of PKK 
As early as 1986, the PKK addressed financial issues at their third Congress, 
which was held at Helvi Camp (later renamed as Mahsun Korkmaz Training Academy) 
in Lebanon. Their Congress, which regulates financial activities in broad and professional 
perspective, decided to provide a budget that would be operated by appointed people who 
would be in charge of all financial activities.73 There are different estimates on the total 
amount involved in PKK financing activities. Some Turkish officials estimate the PKK’s 
annual financial income at $650–700 million.74 On the other hand, the 2007 NATO 
Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit Report estimated the total annual financial activities at 
$50–100 million.75 Europe has taken an important part in PKK’s financing activities. 
Roth and Sever claim that, “Europe has become a prominent playing field for PKK 
funding activities, as it takes advantage of EU carelessness in policing front activities.”76 
According to Turkey’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs Internet site Europe is very important 
for PKK because the organization finds most of its financial sources among Europe 
affiliates. Legal and illegal sources of PKK income that have been identified include: 
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• Extortion (largely from Turkish businessmen) 
• Revenues obtained from the ‘special nights’ organized by affiliates 
• Sales of publications 
• Revenues obtained from commercial establishments belonging 
to/affiliated with the organization. 
• Money collected through drug-trafficking, arms-smuggling and trafficking 
in human beings.77  
3. Trans-border Financing Activities of the PKK 
The eastern and southeastern borders of Turkey have been the key element of 
financing activities for the PKK. Following the intervention of the United States in Iraq 
in 2003, the PKK has taken advantage of the turmoil in the south to open new camps in 
the Kandil Mountains and manage its illegal financing activities around these borders. 
a. Drug Trafficking and Producing Narcotics 
Drug trafficking has always been on the agenda of several terrorist 
organizations. Besides being a profitable business, the large demand for and the 
simplicity of its production, illicit drug trafficking has become an attractive source of 
income for terrorist groups. The PKK has been a part of drug trafficking from the 
beginning. It was estimated that in the early 1990s the organization controlled 70 to 80 
percent of the heroin trade in Europe. In large part this success is due to Turkey’s 
geographic location, which has made the country a transit route for drug traffickers.78  
The PKK first started in the drug business merely collecting protection 
money or insurance fees from organized crime groups. Thereafter, the terrorist 
organization established its own transportation and distribution system from the source 
countries to the consumer European countries. Even so, because they fear losing the 
political support of European sympathizers, the PKK leaders do not accept any claim of 
direct involvement in drug trafficking. Abdullah Ocalan, the imprisoned head of the 
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PKK, did make a statement to the court, however, that reveals the relationship between 
drug traffickers in Iran and the organization.79  
According to a report released by the Turkish National Police Department 
of Anti-Smuggling and Organized Crime, the department conducted 365 different drug 
investigations linked to the PKK terrorist organization between 1984 and 2011. In these 
operations, a high percentage of the drugs seized came from 60 terrorist cells of the PKK. 
The amount of the drugs that were captured in the operations is as follows: 4.253 kg 
heroin, 22.878 kg hashish, 710 kg cocaine, 337.412 synthetic drugs and amphetamines, 
26.190 Lt acetic anhydride and two drug laboratories.80 This statistic shows how deeply 
involved the PKK is in producing drugs. Organization members produce heroin by 
mixing base morphine that comes from the Golden Crescent region with synthetics like 
acetic anhydride at these laboratories.81 
Heroin produced in Afghanistan moves to the international market through 
various routes: 
• To Europe through Pakistan and Turkey or the Balkans 
• To the United States through Pakistan via the port of Karachi 
• To Moscow through Pakistan, Central Asia, and Chechnya 
• To Europe through the Central Asian Republics to Moscow82 
From its early years, the PKK has had a vital role in the first route of the 
heroin trafficking by claiming authority on the drug trafficking routes from the Golden 
Crescent countries through Turkey and the Balkans to the European countries. It tries the 
fix the problems between the domestic and foreign drug dealers in the region which 
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enhances its authority with drug dealers in the region.83 In short, the drug trade has 
provided a particularly lucrative business for the PKK in that region.84 
b. Human Trafficking 
Today, because of several reasons such as human rights problems, civil 
wars, disasters and political instabilities, people from underdeveloped and developing 
countries have been force to leave their home countries. Because it is a lucrative business 
that has lower risks than other illegal activities; immigrant trafficking has grown popular 
with terrorist organizations. The UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 
defines migrant smuggling as: “Procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a 
financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of 
which the person is not a national or a permanent resident.”85 
There are several cases that show the PKK’s involvement in illegal 
immigrant trafficking, and it has many advantages for the PKK. In addition to being a 
financing source, it is used by the terrorists as a method of recruitment. Besides, it is a 
good method by which to transfer wounded militants to European countries, where these 
militants can later become political asylum seekers. There are similarities between human 
and drug trafficking in terms of the routes used. Kurtis and Karacan note that “some of 
the group’s illicit profits come from a sophisticated people-smuggling network that 
transports refugees from northern Iraq to Italy. The three most frequently used routes for 
this movement are Istanbul-Milan, Istanbul-Bosnia-Milan, and Turkey-Tunisia-Malta-
Italy.”86 
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Furthermore, the PKK has an important effect on other illegal human 
traffickers and forces them to pay regularly to the organization. Besides being a 
significant source of revenue, the PKK uses this method to recruit asylum seekers for 
future activities, especially European countries, by providing them shelter and jobs. 
Habib Ozdemir and Ilker Pekgozlu, depending on the statement of an arrested human 
trafficker, point out that PKK threatens other human traffickers and pushes them either to 
stop their activities or to cooperate with the terrorist organization in these activities, and 
then collects so-called taxes from them regularly.87 Finally, during their transportation, 
some asylum seekers use forged passports and documents that the PKK provides for 
them. PKK’s huge network in Europe facilitates the smuggling activities and allows the 
organization to attract many more customers. On their way, these asylum seekers receive 
lodging, food and employment from PKK-affiliated organizations in different 
countries.88 
c. Illegal Trade Revenues: Taxation along the Border Line 
In addition to engaging in smuggling activities themselves, the PKK 
routinely collects money under the name of taxation from other drug traffickers. 
According to testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee of the Judiciary Subcommittee 
on Technology, Terrorism and Government Information, “The PKK ‘taxes’ ethnic 
Kurdish drug traffickers and individual cells that traffic heroin to support their 
operations.”89 In addition to illicit traffickers, the PKK also taxes the vehicles which 
work legally. According to a report released by the International Center for Terrorism and 
Transnational Crime (UTSAM) under the Turkish National Police Academy, the  
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terrorists tax the smugglers operating along the Iran and Iraq border line for 
approximately 10 percent of the value of the smuggled items. According to same report, 
the PKK’s custom tariff is as follows:90 
• $65K per 1 Kilo heroin, 25K per 1 Kilo morphine base, 3K per 1 
kilo cocaine 
• $7 per mule load of cigarettes or tea, $5 per same amount of sugar, 
• $100 per capita in trafficking activates, 
• $3 per sheep and goat, $5 per cattle. 
The detailed tariff demonstrates that the organization relies heavily on 
taxation of smuggling activities on the land border. By using this tariff system, the PKK 
has taxed the human traffickers approximately $30 million and cigarette smugglers $4 
million in 2011. 
Since Turkey has long borders with Iran (560 km), Iraq (384 km) and 
Syria (911km), it is hard for Turkey to control its borders in terms of smuggling 
activities. The PKK shares the same route with different kinds of smugglers in order to 
infiltrate the Turkish territory and to commit act of violence. These activities introduce a 
new kind of financing method to the PKK: illegal trade revenues or so-called “customs.” 
The organization collects money from smugglers on the borders of Turkey, Iran and Iraq. 
The terrorist organization has established different customs areas near the Turkey-Iraq 
border, which include: Mosul, Bele Kati, Zap and Haftanin. The PKK collects money 
from transit passers, especially truck drivers, under the name of insurance fee throughout 
those check zones, mainly to and from Turkey.91 Overall, as Ozdemir and Pekgozlu 
indicate, based on a terrorist’s statement, “the PKK has had significant control over 
illegal trade revenues in the Turkey-Iran-Iraq triangle due to a lack of a strong 
governmental presence, intensive local support, and mountainous terrain.”92 
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d. State Sponsorship 
For the first years of the organization, state sponsorship used to form an 
important part of financing activities of the PKK. According to the “Patterns of Terrorism 
Report” released by the U.S. Secretary of State, Iran supported the organization and 
provided a haven for PKK militants.93 Over time, though, its main sources of financing 
have changed. Since the late 1990s, it has moved away from state sponsorship to illegal 
activities and popular support. Once financed mainly by Syria and other states interested 
in weakening Turkey, the vast majority of money now comes from other financing means 
such as drug trafficking and extortion.94 Nonetheless, recent developments in the region 
such as civil war in Syria and Iran’s support of the Syrian regime might give rise to state 
sponsorship once again since Turkey has been supporting the rebellion in contrast to Iran. 
So, this choice might bring the support of Iran and Syria to the PKK, especially by means 
of borders. 
e. Other Methods 
The financing system of terrorist organizations has different phases, and 
funding methods form only one segment of the greater financing cycle. At the same time, 
terrorist organizations move the money they earn, and then spend or store their incomes. 
The PKK spends most of its income on the cross-border activities funding weapons and 
ammunition purchases and on organizational and living expenses that form a large part of 
the expenditures of the organization. Since all terrorists inside Turkey’s border—
estimated at 1,500—have transferred from Iraq, Iran and Syria across land borders, the 
money follows the same path. Thus, it is impossible to stop the financing cycle of 
terrorists inside Turkey’s borders without securing those borders.  
 
                                                 
93 Secretary of State US, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, “Overview of State-
Sponsored Terrorism, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1992,” accessed March 8, 2013, 
https://www.fas.org/irp/threat/terror_92/sponsored.html. 
94 Michael Jonsson and Svante Cornell, “Kurds and Pay—Examining PKK Financing,” Jane’s 
Intelligence Review (2008). 
 30 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 31 
III. BORDER SECURITY AND TURKEY 
A. BORDER SECURITY 
1. Definitions and Approaches 
People have always felt the need for various reasons to divide the world into 
territorial areas; however, this process has generally ended up with clashes. Borders have 
been a source of conflict amongst the states throughout the history. The emergence of 
new states in the last century made this conflict bigger and harder to resolve. The 
regulation of cross-border activities is perceived as a necessity for the sovereignty of new 
nation states. Inherently, this process has been perceived from military perspective. After 
the end of the Cold War, this trend shifted dramatically, and new players have gotten into 
the field through terrorism and drug smuggling, and these new sorts of threats necessitate 
an efficient border-management system to protect citizens.95  
First, a definition of the terms is important to prevent future misunderstandings. 
Dashdavaa Dashtseren suggests the clear definition for different terms regarding borders. 
Boundaries are linear features and limit of a subject—dividing lines between states. 
Frontiers are more than what boundaries represent; they are the district near such a line, 
zones or areas that are usually limited by a boundary. On the other hand, borders are 
demarcations of boundaries; they are the concrete and visible version of boundaries such 
as fences, gates, and ditches.96 Since it is an interdisciplinary field, geographers, 
historians, lawyers, political scientists and some others have contributed to the subject. 
Samuel Whittemore Boggs states that even though international boundaries are just lines 
located on the earth’s surface, the human significance makes them really potent.97 
The emergence of modern boundaries, as Boggs has argued, is mainly the result 
of the outgrowth of nationalism within the last two centuries. Prior to the modern 
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boundaries, earlier ones were generally zones or border marches. He approaches the 
definition from a broader perspective. An international border constitutes a barrier and 
divides the people on opposite sides.98 
Historically, the prevention of invasion by enemy countries has been the main 
point of the border security system, and it was correlated with a state’s sovereignty. 
Nonetheless, after the growing globalization trend perceptions of and the approach to 
border security have changed because of the necessary interaction with the parties. Since 
new actors such as drug traffickers, illegal immigrants and other transnational threats 
came into play, border security is more complex than it used to be. As Dashtseren 
explains, “Border security is the means by which industrialized countries stop the 
unauthorized entry of persons, provide customs control, and enforce applicable sanitary 
and veterinary law.”99 
2. Types of Boundaries 
The term boundary represents a line which could be drawn in a treaty, arbitral 
award or a commission or created naturally by mountains, rivers and shore lines. There 
are different sorts of boundary lines, which are established either historically or naturally 
between the states. Boggs defines international boundaries as “the sum of all boundaries 
between two nations, whether they traverse land, rivers, lakes, or arms of the sea through 
territorial waters out to the high sea.”100  Another type of boundary is the disputed 
boundary. It can occur between subdivisions of a country or between two or more 
countries. There is no consensus of the borderline among the opponent sides, and the 
dispute generally remains unsolved. There is also a treaty line, which is a boundary 
recognized by an official treaty between two or more countries. It is not finalized until it 
is agreed upon by all the involved countries. The last type is the indefinite boundary, 
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which is an approximate boundary. These are often historic boundaries, which need to be 
surveyed officially mainly because of the outdated methods of measurement.101 
Another classification is made based upon the formation of the boundary. The 
first type is natural boundaries such as mountain crests, rivers and the shore lines of lakes 
and seas. The type refers to geographical boundaries and has been used to establish 
borders for a long time. On the other hand, boundaries which are marked by stones or 
monuments are known as artificial, or conventional, boundaries.  
Another classification is made by Boggs, who divides boundaries into four major 
groups: Physical, Geometrical, Anthropogeographic, and Complex and Compound 
boundaries. Each major group has subdivisions which categorize borders according to 
their regions, shapes, geography and styles.102 
3. Globalization and Post 9/11 
The 9/11 attacks changed many policies including border security measures in the 
U.S. Warner argues that the hijackings and subsequent events were a turning point in 
border security management.103 “The new security measures are multifaceted, 
constituting a major part of the U.S. government’s response to terrorism. A vastly 
increased federal presence on U.S. boundaries is one of the most visible signs of the 
changes. “U.S. Border Patrol and Customs agents were placed on ‘Level 1’ alert after the 
attacks, manually checking every vehicle and person entering the country”104 Moreover, 
9/11 has created new threats to border security particularly in uncontrolled areas. 
Homeland Security Chief Michael Chertoff has noted that there began another problem 
with the land borders: the likelihood of terrorists infiltrating the land borders. To 
conclude, the scope of border-security management changed dramatically after 9/11. The 
main emphasis originally was on the prevention of trafficking drugs and immigrants; 
however, it turned out to be terrorism as the main threat.  
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It is widely argued that globalization is the biggest threat for national borders. It 
made national borders more open and vulnerable to the new emerging threats. After the 
end of the Cold War, trends towards globalization and the resulting flow of people and 
goods across borders challenged traditional concepts of border management. However, 
the past decade has seen a growing emphasis on security, even as globalization brings 
economic integration and interdependence, which lead to more open borders and more 
harmonious cross-border relations. Kenneth N. Hansen argues that the approach of 
international political economy to globalization and a liberal market aims to remove the 
existing obstacles on international borders.105 As previously mentioned, a “globalized” 
world creates new problems which entail an update in the perception of threats. 
Consequently, traditional security threats are being reconsidered accounting the 
economic, social, and other considerations. 
In sum, Dasthseren observes the main impact of globalization on border security 
has been that the relationships in the international system have become much more 
complicated than a system that only includes nation-states, and the domination of 
capitalism in the macroeconomic system has caused economic and security integration 
more than ever before. As a result, both of these impacts have introduced new outcomes. 
First, each state now has less authority in forming and implementing its own border 
security practices against transnational threats. Second, transnational threats (e.g., 
terrorism, illegal immigration, drug trafficking, and organized crime) require a 
cooperative solution. Thus, cooperative approaches to border security have gained 
importance in dealing with terrorism and other trans-national crimes along with the 
globalization.106 
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B. TURKEY’S BORDERS: BACKGROUND, HISTORY, AND CURRENT 
DEVELOPMENTS 
1. Background and Challenges 
Turkey has always been a cross-road country and is located at the center of 
various migration routes. It is located both at Southeastern Europe and Southwestern 
Asia. The country is bordered by seas on three sides to form a peninsula—bordering the 
Black Sea, between Bulgaria and Georgia, and bordering the Aegean Sea and the 
Mediterranean Sea, between Greece and Syria. The country has a geo-strategic location, 
joining Asia to Europe. Furthermore, it has historical and political importance in the 
region which entails strong relationships among the neighboring countries. Some of the 
land borders, like the one with Iran, were established long ago, but some of them, such as 
those with Iraq and Syria, were established by treaties after the collapse of the Ottoman 
Empire.107 The terms of such treaties in regards to the borders were not elaborated on 
carefully by the constitution process and still create problems in controlling the 
borders.108 The artificial border lines divided countries but not constituencies who live 
along the border regions. Turkey’s borders also have a strategic importance because she 
is a bridge between stable and the unstable regions. Illegal immigrants, refugees, 
terrorists and various traffickers use Turkey’s border to reach their final destination: EU 
countries. Moreover, political instability in bordering countries creates new refugee 
problems. More than 400.000 refugees crossed Turkey’s southeast land border during the 
ongoing civil war in Syria. For these reasons, Turkey’s border should be examined and 
evaluated carefully because of its unique challenges: domestic warfare, Arab Spring, 
political instability, regime changes in neighboring countries and terrorist activities in the 
region. 
Turkey has been also a destination country for some of the illegal migrants. Since 
Turkey is a relatively more stable and democratic country in the region and offers a better 
life standard, illegal migrants sometimes choose to stay here and look for employment 
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opportunities. Turkey is a transit country in many types of illegal activities to the Western 
World, due to its being a bridge between Europe and Asia. Since the control of Turkey’s 
eastern borders has not been easy, the illegal immigrant generally prefers Turkey as the 
first alternative route. In addition, there are routes for illegal immigrants of Africa-
Mediterranean Countries, Russian Federation-Poland, Caucasian Countries-Ukraine and 
Syria-Lebanon. Table 1 shows the distribution of Turkish Land Borders. 
 
Neighboring Country  Length of the Border  
Bulgaria  269 km.  
Greece  203 km.  
Syria  911 km.  
Iraq  384 km.  
Iran  560 km.  
Nahcevan (Azerbaijan)  18 km.  
Armenia  328 km.  
Georgia  276 km.  
Total Length of the Land Border  2.949 km.  
Table 1.   Turkey’s Land Borders. 
The last challenge for Turkish border security is the ethnic diversity of people 
living along the border line. During the Iraq-Turkey boundary formation process in 
1920s, the report that was sent to the League Council demonstrated the complexity of the 
situation: “The disputed territory was described as a transition zone extending from the 
rugged Kurdish Mountains on the north to the Arab plains on the South, from Syria and 
Armenia on the West to Iraq and Luristan on the Southeast…The country is inhabited by 
Kurds, Arabs, Christians, Turks, Yezidi and Jews.”109 Thus, one of the main underlying 
difficultness of border control is the variance of ethnicities being spread around a small 
amount of rough geography. 
                                                 
109 Ibid., 149.  
 37 
2. Turkey’s Current Border Protection System 
a. Overview 
Currently, the general entry and exit security procedures at the gates are 
fulfilled by Turkish National Police. The task that is performed by the police at the border 
gates dates back to the formation of the Republic. The service has been performed 
uninterruptedly by the Turkish National Police from the establishment of the modern 
Turkish State. The task definition has been stated in the Security Department Law no. 
3201 on 4 June 1937.110 This act regulates the main organization of the Turkish National 
Police including border management. According to this regulation, the responsibility of 
processes regarding passports, asylum affairs, and border gates were assigned to the 
Department for Aliens, Borders, and Asylum Affaires of Turkish National Police.111 
Some other laws also regulate the issues related to border security in 
addition to Law No. 2559 on the Duties of the Police, including:  
• The Penal Code No. 5237, the Penal Procedure Law No. 5271  
• Meetings and Demonstrations Regulation Law No. 2911 
• Combating-Terrorism Law No. 3713  
• Firearms and Knives Law No. 6136  
• Highway Safety Law No. 2918  
• Turkish Citizenship Law No. 403 
• Fighting Trafficking Law No. 4926 
• Fighting Narcotics Law No. 3298 
• Passport Law No. 5682,  
• Residence and Travel of the Foreigners in Turkey Law No. 5683  
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These supplementary laws contain the basic border procedures which 
helps the police perform border security duties. Turkey has had difficulties in establishing 
a solid border security management process since the country has long and 
geographically harsh border lines. 
b. Existing Departments in Charge 
Establishing a solid border security management process has been 
complicated not only by long and geographically harsh border lines but also by the 
variety of government bodies in the current structure. The current system authorizes the 
Ministry of Interior to be responsible for the overall border management system. The 
governors and sub-governors (kaymakam) fulfill these general requirements, and they 
work closely with the Turkish Land Forces Command in performing their task. 
According to the European Union Report on Turkey’s Border System, the following 
institutions are part of the current border management and control system: 
• General Directorate of Security, responsible for the entry and exit 
of the persons at border gates, 
• Undersecretary of Customs, responsible for the examining of the 
entry and exit of the goods at border, generally anti-smuggling law 
enforcement tasks, 
• Gendarmerie General Command, responsible for the surveillance 
of 17 percent of all borders (125 km part of the Iran border and all 
of 384 km Iraq border), 
• Land Forces General Command, , responsible for the surveillance 
of 83 percent of all borders, 
• Coast Guard Command, responsible for the surveillance duties at 
maritime borders (between the border gates).112 
c. Surveillance Mechanisms 
The Customs Guards Organization, under the Ministry of Customs and 
Trades, is responsible for the border gates in terms of preventing and investigating 
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smuggling activities. This organization has law enforcement capabilities and works 
closely with the Anti-Smuggling Department of Turkish National Police. Especially due 
to the increase of smuggling activities at the Syria, Iran and Iraq border, the General 
Command of Customs protection was set up to be in charge of the protection of these 
border for investigation of smuggling and other major trans-border activities.   
On the other hand, other surveillance services are implemented mainly by 
the Gendarmerie General Command and the Coast Guard Command which both have law 
enforcement capabilities although they are military organizations. As indicated above, the 
Land Forces General Command is responsible for the security of about 83 percent of the 
land borders; however it has no law enforcement capabilities. In the case of an incident at 
the borders, such as all kinds of trafficking and illegal crossings, the Land Forces units 
immediately inform the gendarmerie or National Police units for necessary investigation 
and pass the cases to one of these bodies.113  
3. EU Process 
Turkey has been struggling to be a member of the EU for a long time. In 
accordance with the EU acquis, the total body of EU law, control and security of the 
borders are included under Justice, Freedom and Security. To make the current system in 
compliance with EU regulations and practices, Turkey set up a Task Force for Asylum, 
Migration and Protection of External Borders under the coordination of the Ministry of 
Interior in 2002. In fulfilling this task, Turkey started the implementation of the twinning 
project “Support for The Development of an Action Plan to Implement Turkey’s 
Integrated Border Management Strategy” on 19 July 2004 under the supervision of and in 
cooperation with the French-UK Consortium. The main aim of this action plan is to 
determine the legal and institutional adjustments and then make the necessary reforms. 
The final draft of the action and reform plan includes the legislative arrangement, training 
of new staff, institutional reforms, physical infrastructure and the equipment necessary to  
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implement the decisions made. The EU body takes this border management alignment 
task seriously also because if Turkey is accepted as a member state, then Turkish Borders 
will form the Union’s Eastern border.114 
4. Need for a New Border Management System in Turkey 
As mentioned earlier, Turkey’s strategic location gives rise to all many illegal 
trafficking activities focusing on this country. For some, Turkey is a transit country for 
reaching the EU countries; however, for others it is a target country due to its recent 
economic developments. Turkey needs to reform its border security system for various 
reasons: EU pressure, terrorism problems, drug trafficking, etc. Since this study focuses 
on the TF activities of the PKK, the need for border security will be assessed in terms of 
financing activities of the PKK through land borders.115 
Turkey needs more secure border because she is the most popular transit route in 
terms of trafficking activities to EU countries according to the EU report. Two out of 
three illegal immigrants in the EU happened to use Turkey as a transit country. 
Considering the taxation tariff of the PKK on human traffickers, Turkey should take the 
necessary steps to prevent trafficking activities and consequently PKK financing 
activities. 
In addition, there is a need for reconstruction and reform in the border gates. As 
previously mentioned, one of the financing methods of the PKK is moving the money 
which was collected in Europe via border gates. Especially large amounts of cash have 
been transferred from the headquarters of the organization, through the Kandil 
Mountains, to local units in Turkey. Instead of illegal ways, the PKK uses Kurdish 
businessmen who periodically pass the border gates in order to transfer cash money to the 
terrorist network within Turkey. Once the money gets into Turkey from across the 
border, it is hard to keep track of it and counter the future financing activities in Turkey. 
                                                 
114 E. Popa and RG Erdinc, “Economic Aspects of Implementing the Integrated Border Security 
Management,” Managerial Challenges of the Contemporary Society, no. 3 (2012): 148–152; “Towards the 
Implementation of Turkey’s Integrated Border Management Strategy.” Abstract.   
115 Arif Köktaş, Sınır Güvenlik Birimi Kurma Çalışmaları (Ankara, Turkey: Institute of Strategic 
Thinking, 2011), 17–20.  
 41 
Moreover, the drug manufacturing and trafficking activities of the PKK along the 
border lines pose a threat to the sovereignty of Turkey as a state. An ungoverned border 
area is deemed to be a problem of third world countries. This misperception gives rise to 
damage to the prestige of Turkey in the international arena. Also, the money coming from 
the drug business constitutes a significant portion of the PKK’s financing activities. A 
better fight with all drug activities can be possible by means of more strengthened border 
lines. 
Lastly, uncontrolled border lines affect the counter financing activities of the PKK 
in Europe. The Kurdish Businessmen in Europe give huge amounts of money to the 
organization. Most of these businessmen are actually a leg of the trafficking and 
smuggling network in Europe. Thus, destroying the trafficking activities with a 
strengthened border can affect the income of the Kurdish Businessman in Europe. 
Consequently, reform in the existing border security system can be beneficial to counter 
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IV. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF BORDER SECURITY: THE 
UNITED STATES 
A. OVERVIEW 
The U.S. is giving more emphasis on border security as a part of its national 
security strategy since 9/11. More than 7,500 miles of border with two neighboring 
countries—Mexico and Canada—have been affected after the changes in security threat 
perceptions. Since these two countries are the two largest trading partners of U.S., the 
flow of goods and services without any interruption due to security measures is vital for 
U.S. economic well-being. On the other hand, there are dangerous goods and people that 
need to be kept outside. Since the goal of security is not necessarily compatible with the 
free flow of goods and people, the most challenging task has been achieving a balance 
between those two: ensuring security and protecting the flow of goods, services and 
travelers. The prevention of terrorism has become the main goal of the border security 
effort of the U.S. in the post-9/11 period.116 
The United States has borders with both Mexico and Canada. The border with 
Mexico is a land and river border; to the north, with Canada the border is a land and a 
lake border. Including Alaska and Hawaii, U.S. borders cover 19,841 miles. Of this 
border, 1,933 miles run along the U.S.-Mexico border—it is also known as South Border. 
This border line has been contentious because of unauthorized immigration, drug and 
arms trafficking and other drug-related crimes. After 9/11 the possibility of terrorist entry 
has become another concern related to this Southern border line. On the other hand, the 
U.S. shares an approximately 5,000 mile border with Canada. Being geographically 
rough, this border has been a security zone and considered to be the longest unprotected 
zone in the world.117 The Canadian border is more problematic than the one in the South 
because of its size and the wilderness. Another reason is that Canada has a background 
with terrorism. Canada has been perceived as a safe corridor for entering the United 
States. Americans have some general concerns on the open-door immigration policy of 
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Canada. On the top of it, unprotected borders and coastlines offer many safe points of 
entry that can facilitate illegal cross-border activities towards the United States.118 
Besides terrorism, the smuggling of marijuana and cigarettes are other issues. Because of 
all these reasons, after 9/11, protecting the northern border—like the one in the South—
has become the part of national security policy. 
Increased border control procedures after 9/11 is have posed challenges for the 
U.S. These procedures have had some negative effects on legal travelers as well. 
Tourism, business and other legal entries into the United States have been adversely 
affected by the strict security measures. Furthermore, there is a need for skilled 
immigrants, who are vital for U.S. companies, research institutions and universities, to 
enter the country. They have been discouraged by these new measures and have sought 
out different countries. It is hard to predict the long-term effect of losing highly skilled 
immigrants.119 
Finally, the border security effort has been a challenging task for the U.S. after 
9/11 since criminal and terrorist organizations have begun to manipulate the notion of 
free movement of goods and people. Al-Qaeda is a global network using commercial 
travel routes and the Internet. Moreover, major political events in the world have created 
destabilized societies which lead to a rise in organized crime activities. As indicated 
earlier, terrorist organizations finance their activities by means of organized crime tactics 
such as smuggling and trafficking of arms, drugs and humans and engaging in other 
cross-national financial crimes.120 Worse, some terrorist organizations seek to acquire 
weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Overall, 
these new kinds of threat perceptions made the U.S. become more protective of its 
borders. 
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B. U.S. BORDER SECURITY SYSTEM 
There are several government agencies and organizations which have tasks and 
responsibilities related to border protection in the United States: U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (USCIS), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), U.S. 
Transportation Security Administration (TSA), U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), U.S. 
Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review, U.S. Drug Enforcement 
Administration, U.S. Office of National Drug Control Policy , U.S. Federal Bureau of 
Investigation , U.S. Central Intelligence Agency , U.S. Department of State, U.S. 
Government Accountability Office , U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Commission on Civil 
Rights, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, U.S. House Committee on the 
Judiciary, U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Department of State Bureau of 
Population, Refugees, and Migration, and U.S. National Institute of Justice.121 Even 
though there are too many agencies in the current border protection system to examine 
them all, a few of them have critical roles in border security. In the following sections, 
we will examine these agencies whose main focus is on the protection of U.S. borders. 
1. U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
This organization was formed after 9/11 to integrate the agencies whose main task 
is protecting the U.S. This department carries the main responsibility for securing the 
U.S. borders. DHS controls unauthorized immigration, prevents all terrorism and 
improves the border-protection methods via different subordinate agencies. The main 
agencies charged with border security under DHS are Customs and Border Protection 
(CBP), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Citizenship and Immigration 
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our borders through the deployment of personnel, technology, and infrastructure; as well 
as working closely with our neighbors in Canada and Mexico, and our many federal, 
state, local, tribal, and territorial partners.”122 
DHS also coordinates the activities of its agencies to carry out its border security 
mission. Additionally, DHS focuses on new technology, which will be discussed later in 
this chapter, for better infrastructure and more efficient border environment. In sum, DHS 
is the main body responsible for protecting the borders of the U.S. 
2. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) 
This agency is the main body responsible for border protection under DHS. The 
top priority of this agency is to keep terrorists and their weapons from entering the United 
States. It is the government’s largest law enforcement work force to protect ports of entry 
with air and marine support in fulfilling its job. CBP contains two separate agencies: U.S. 
Border Patrol (USBP) and Office of Field Operations (OFO). CBP is responsible for 
protecting nearly 7,000 miles of land border with Canada and Mexico and 2,000 miles of 
coastal waters surrounding Florida and Southern California. Nearly 52,000 employees 
work in the agency. In addition to preventing illegal entry to country, CBP is also 
responsible for securing and facilitating trade and travel by enforcing hundreds of U.S. 
regulations on immigration and drugs. This is the most visible and to-the-point agency 
among those which protect the U.S. borders.123 
a. U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) 
Prior to 9/11, illegal immigrants, as well as human and drug trafficking 
were the main focus of the Border Patrol. According to the first National Strategic Plan-
1994 of the agency, the main aim was to take all necessary measures by using manpower 
and resources directly on the borders to deter illegal activities. This strategy was called 
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prevention-through-deterrence and sought to take preventive measures instead of trying 
to arrest people after they had already crossed the borders.124 
After 9/11, the Border Patrol put terrorism as its priority threat perception. 
The goal of preventing terrorism took shape in the new strategic plan. This plan basically 
focuses on two main goals and other objectives under the main goals: 
Goal 1: Secure America’s Borders  
• Objective 1.1: Prevent Terrorists and Terrorist Weapons from 
Entering the United States  
• Objective 1.2: Manage Risk  
• Objective 1.3: Disrupt and Degrade Transnational Criminal 
Organizations  
• Objective 1.4: Whole-of-Government Approach  
• Objective 1.5: Increase Community Engagement 
Goal 2: Strengthen the Border Patrol 
• Objective 2.1: Strengthen Investment in People 
• Objective 2.2: Support Border Patrol Employees  
• Objective 2.3: Preserve Organizational Integrity  
• Objective 2.4: Improve Organizational Structures, Processes, 
Systems, and Doctrine 
• Objective 2.5: Enhance Overall Efficiency of the Border Patrol125 
According to this plan, border Patrol seek to secure America’s border by 
means of strengthening it. The second goal has come out after 9/11, since, as previously 
mentioned, border security system was decided to be reformed after the attacks. As a part 
of this reform process, Border Patrol has begun the focus on organizational and personnel 
enhancement. In the meantime, the aspect of the first goal has been expanded. An 
integrated approach to the border security has gained importance as well as the 
community engagement. 
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The Border Patrol has experienced many changes since its establishment 
in 1924; however, the one thing has remained unchanged, its mission to detect and 
prevent the illegal entry of aliens into the United States. There are currently nearly 20,000 
border agents in the organization, and all Border Patrol agents take a 19-week training 
program at the Border Patrol Academy in Artesia, New Mexico. In Fiscal Year 2009, 
Border Patrol agents seized more than 10,900 pounds of cocaine and more than 2.6 
million pounds of marijuana.126 
b. Office of Field Operations (OFO) 
OFO agents are in charge of conducting immigration, customs and 
agricultural and biological inspections at official ports of entry. They also have tasks in 
securing and expediting international trade at all ports of entry. OFO officers determine 
the admissibility of any individual who seeks entry into the United States. 
One of the most important tasks of OFO is cargo examinations. After 9/11, 
OFO takes an important position in the defense of U.S. Homeland Security to protect the 
country against terrorists and WMDs. OFO’s mission is not only the physical 
examination of cargo when it arrives in U.S. ports but also using intelligence from 
different sources to identify high-risk shipments. CBP/OFO also focuses on the 
facilitation of legitimate trade. In achieving this goal, OFO has initiated a number of 
regulations, such as the use of non-intrusive inspectional technology, to increase its 
ability to examine cargo effectively without slowing the flow of trade. 
C. TECHNOLOGY IN U.S. BORDER SECURITY  
To sustain the flow of goods and people properly, border security agencies use 
technology in their routine. Technology can increase the capabilities of the border 
security system, and it is hard to achieve effective security without using technology. 
Technology extends the eyes and ears of Border Patrol agents. United States border 
security agencies utilize different technical equipment and computer software while 
fulfilling their tasks.  
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Among the essential technology that the U.S. uses in border protection is UAVs. 
This technology extends the visual range and scope of surveillance of Border Patrol 
agents. The Border Patrol started to use UAVs in 2004, becoming the first civilian law 
enforcement agency in the world to use UAVs to carry out a civilian law enforcement 
mission. UAVs make long-range surveillance possible and facilitate the monitoring of 
remote land border areas where patrols cannot easily travel. They are very cost-effective 
for great distances and harsh terrain since infrastructure is difficult or impossible to build 
on these areas. Furthermore, the Integrated Surveillance Intelligence System provides the 
detection, monitoring and response to illegal activities along the borders. UAVs provide 
necessary information for responding units through Integrated Intelligence System. 
Second, there are high-tech biometric detection programs, such as the Automated 
Biometric Identification System (IDENT), United States Visitor and Immigrant Status 
Indication Technology (US-VISIT) and the Integrated Automated Fingerprint 
Identification System (IAFIS). Additionally, a National Security Entry-Exit Registration 
System (NSEERS) and the Trilogy Project are designed to promote cooperation among 
different government agencies by allowing them to work from the same database. 
Regarding the high volume of individual entries into the U.S., it is important to separate 
high-risk travelers from low-risk travelers.127  
The NEXUS (Trusted Traveler Program), Secure Electronic Network for 
Travelers Rapid Inspection (SENTRI), Free and Secure Trade (FAST) and the Easy-pass 
systems help the ordinary traveler move quickly through border checkpoints. 
Furthermore, the Border Patrol uses various forms of technology to gain control of the 
borders and to better detect, deter and respond to incidents at the borders. Technology 
used by Border Patrol includes:128 
• Thermal Hand-Held Imaging Devices   
• Unattended Ground Sensors  
• Personal Radiation Detectors   
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• Radiation Isotope Identification Devices )  
• Vehicle and Cargo Inspection System  
• Night Vision Devices   
• Mobile Surveillance System 
• Mobile Video Surveillance System 
• Remote Video Surveillance System 
• Z Backscatter X-Ray Vehicles 
• Integrated Fixed Towers 
Third, it is also important to check the cargo as well as humans without slowing 
down legitimate trade. There are different types of technologies used at the ports of entry 
in the U.S. to accomplish this task. These technical devices (including VACIS, RVIS, 
biological/radiological-particle detectors, personal radiation detectors, high explosives 
detection systems, isotope identifiers, X-ray imaging machines and fiber optic scopes) 
can quickly scan people or containers, instead of having to inspect them manually. 
Moreover, the cargo-tracking systems in use trace the containers from their original 
loading points to final destination. 
Fourth, the advances in communication and information technology are highly 
utilized in the U.S. border protection system. Border agents take advantage of visualized 
borders. Geospatial technology gives all the details that would be hard to reach by other 
means. The computer-based analysis by pinpointing locations and mapping smuggling 
corridors provides agents a virtual playground for predicting illegal immigrant traffic 
routes and methods. Furthermore, border security agents who are fully equipped with 
technical devices can use accurate and timely electronic information to respond more 
quickly and effectively to protect the border. Since border security personnel have 
become more mobile, radio and data communications have also gained in importance. To 
ensure that communication is more secure and fast, the U.S. border protection agencies 
use improved field communication through land mobile radio, cellular coverage and 
enhanced satellite communication. 
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D. THE NEW ERA, POST 9/11: THE EVOLVING GOAL OF BORDER 
SECURITY 
The events of 9/11 have had an impact on the goals of border security agencies of 
the U.S. Before 9/11, the priority of the border security system was prevention of drug 
trafficking and unauthorized migrants, especially at the U.S.-Mexico border. The security 
of entry points and visa processes were not weighed too much prior to 9/11, and the U.S.-
Canada border was almost neglected. Even though terrorism incidents occur seldom and 
terrorists are a few in the U.S. in contrast to drug trafficking and immigration problems, 
terrorism has become the key border security issue after 9/11. Border security programs 
have improved since 9/11, and most border security measures focus on unauthorized 
entry and visa processes. The attacks also triggered modernization and government funds 
for existing programs at that time. The Canadian border, which is also known as “longest 
undefended border,” has gained more importance in terms of illegal entry to the country 
and more emphasis has been given to the security measures along the northern border 
after 9/11.129 
In addition to security measures, 9/11 has had an effect on the U.S. bureaucratic 
system and laws. First, DHS was established in 2002 to organize and coordinate the 
subordinate agencies dealing with terrorism and national security. The director of DHS 
became a cabinet-level member of government. At the same time, the U.S. Immigration 
and Naturalization Service (INS) was shut down, and its functions were allocated to the 
other agencies such as CIS, ICE and CBP.130 
The Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) was created under DHS as 
the main agency responsible for border security. In addition, the Container Security 
Initiative was adopted in January 2002 as a strategy to secure the trade flow and prevent 
acts of terror involving the international maritime supply chain. As a result of this 
strategy, CBP officers in 58 foreign seaports have started to work together with their host 
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country equivalents.131 In sum, even though 9/11 did not change the previous threat 
perceptions for border security, such as immigration and drugs, the attacks changed 
priorities. Terrorism became the major threat perception for border security policies, and 
consequently border security became a critical instrument of national security in 
countering terrorism. 
E. BORDER SECURITY REFORMS AND TERRORISM 
There have been different reasons in different time periods that have necessitated 
border security reform. Among these reasons have been the globalization trend, national 
security, immigration, post war periods and terrorism. As indicated earlier, 9/11 was a 
turning point for the border protection system of the United States. Even though the 
utmost aim of all border security measures is to prevent illegal entry of goods and 
individuals into the United States, some of them were adopted specifically for counter-
terrorism purposes. This section mainly covers the new regulations at borders which are 
specifically aimed at preventing trans-border activities of terrorist organizations. 
1. Tactical Infrastructure (TI) 
After 9/11, illegal entry into the U.S. became a major issue of national security. 
Thus, DHS was authorized by Section 102 of the Secure Fence Act to build the 
infrastructure, such as fencing, necessary to deter and prevent illegal entry on the borders. 
As a part of this task, the Tactical Infrastructure (TI) program was adopted under the 
Secure Border Initiative in 2007. The primary goal of the program is to help the Border 
Security Agencies prevent terrorists and terrorist weapons, including WMDs, from 
entering the United States. The final aim of the TI program is to build approximately 670 
miles of pedestrian and vehicle fence along the Southwest Border of the United States. 
There are two important benefits of the program:132 
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• Establishing a substantial probability of apprehending terrorists seeking 
entry into the United States; 
• Disrupting and restricting the smuggling of narcotics and humans.  
2. Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and Export Control and Related 
Border Security (EXBS) Program  
The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is an effort that aims to stop trafficking 
of WMDs, their delivery systems and related materials between states and non-state 
actors. The program was launched by the United States in 2003. More than 100 countries 
around the world have already recognized the PSI. After 9/11, terrorists seeking WMDs 
forced the U.S. to take precautions to prevent them. As a result of international 
cooperation that relies on the voluntary actions of states, PSI participants use existing 
authorities to halt WMD-related trafficking and take initiatives to strengthen their 
authorities. The Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) program mainly 
seeks to help member countries improve their export control systems. The EXBS 
program originally focused on WMDs of the former Soviet Union such as Russia, 
Ukraine and Kazakhstan, but after 9/11 it has changed its scope to include other countries 
that pose a terrorism threat. This assistance includes long-term regional advisors, short-
term expert’s equipment and training to other countries for supporting the U.S. 
government objectives in non-proliferation, anti-terrorism and border security.133 
3. Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism (C-TPAT)  
The Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism (C‐TPAT) seeks to secure the 
world’s trade industry from terrorists, basically by maintaining the economic health of 
the U.S. and her trade partners. CBP’s C-TPAT strategy aimed to address the elements of 
the terrorist threat involving the global trade environment. The program was launched 
right after the 9/11 attacks in 2001, and there are currently more than 10,000 certified 
partners in the program. Basically the system works as follows: when companies join the 
anti‐terror partnership, they sign an agreement to work with CBP to protect the supply 
chain, identify security gaps and implement specific security measures voluntarily. The 
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benefit of membership for the company is less time in check points because the C‐TPAT 
members are considered low‐risk, and CPB officers give them priority in examination 
over non-member companies. From the CPB standpoint, this collaboration facilitates 
inspection of over 11 million containers arriving at the U.S. yearly. One other goal of the 
program is to internationalize the main principles of C-TPAT through cooperation within 
the international community.134 
4. Border Patrol Special Operations Group (SOG)  
Since there are some uncommon and risky situations that may occur at borders, a 
special operation group (SOG) was founded under CBP. This group is comprised of three 
distinctive units: the Border Patrol Tactical Unit, Border Patrol Search, Trauma and 
Rescue Unit, and the Border Patrol Special Response Team. The goal of these units is 
parallel to the goal of the main organization: to prevent terrorism, to strengthen control of 
the U.S. borders and to protect America and its citizens. Being highly mobile, these teams 
are the rapid response tool of the CBP to specific events, and SOG increases the ability of 
DHS to respond operationally to specific terrorist threats.135 
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V. TURKEY: A BETTER BORDER PROTECTION SYSTEM IN 
COUNTERING FINANCING OF TERRORISM 
Since the scope of this study is limited to considering methods to counter the 
financial efforts of the PKK terrorist organization via strengthened borders, 
recommendations on land border security related to this objective are provided in this 
chapter. As indicated in earlier chapters, there are four main cross-border financing 
activities of the PKK terrorist organization: drug trafficking and the narcotics production, 
human trafficking, illegal trade revenues and taxation, and state sponsorship. To prevent 
financing activities of the PKK terrorist organization without affecting legitimate free 
trade, Turkish borders need to be strengthened according to careful planning. To 
accomplish this task, U.S. measures taken after 9/11 might help Turkey in achieving her 
goal of stopping the financing activities of the PKK. Thus, Turkey should consider 
initiating institutional and legislative reforms for a more secure border management 
system. As part of this initiative, the borders should be supported with current 
technologies, and certain projects should be implemented to establish surveillance and 
control systems in accordance with EU requirements and modern standards. Stephen E. 
Flynn argues that the transformation of borders in accordance with globalization can be 
accomplished by:  
• developing the means to validate in advance the overwhelming majority of 
the people and goods that cross the border as law abiding and low risk, 
• enhancing the means for agents to target and intercept inbound high risk 
people and goods away from the border.136 
In addition, the main goal of the proposed border protection system should be 
preventing all kinds of terrorist activities. In this regard, border protection and control 
duties of the new system are not restricted to the efforts to prevent small scale trafficking 
and illegal immigration or to identify illegal immigrants among refugees. The primary  
 
 
                                                 
136 Stephen E. Flynn, “Transforming Border Management in the Post-September 11 World” 
(Syracuse, NY, Syracuse University, January, 2002). http://www.cfr.org/border-and-port-
security/transforming-border-management-post-september-11-world/p4463. 
 56 
objective of the proposed border protection process is to prevent the entry of the terrorist 
groups, especially at East and South East borders, and to guard against the terrorist 
attacks.137 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LEGAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL LEVEL 
1. Creation of a New Border Security Agency 
Currently police units perform security duty at the border gates in Turkey. At 
almost all land borders other than border gates, a military unit, Turkish land forces 
without law enforcement powers performs this duty, and at a small portion of the borders, 
gendarmerie units with limited law enforcement powers protect border zones. On the 
other hand, maritime border services are performed by the Coast Guard units with law 
enforcement powers. So first and foremost, it is necessary that all border services should 
be coordinated and implemented by a professional law enforcement unit with the 
necessary training on border security and operating under civilian authority, and the 
Ministry of the Interior should be in charge of performing the duties of protecting, 
controlling and ensuring the security of the land borders, as well as all maritime and air 
border gates of Turkey. The duties of this new body under the Ministry of Interior should 
include activities to combat terrorism, drug trafficking and illegal crossing, and to ensure 
the security of the border gates, passenger entry and exit, passport checks and prevention 
of counterfeit, deportation procedures, security of the borders and physical measures at 
land and border gates. The general duties of this new body in regards to terrorism 
financing should be: 
• to prevent all terrorist activities at border gates and zones 
• to combat trafficking and illegal passages 
• to perform duties related to security of the border gates 
• to control passenger entry and exit  and passport checks 
• to take physical measures such fence building. 
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• to implement and manage the immigration and citizenship policy of the 
Turkish Government 
• to enhance and coordinate international cooperation in the field of border 
security.138 
After the transfer of duties and powers, Turkish Land Forces can be assigned at 
the border zones when it is necessary for national defense requirements. 
2. Reforms in Legal Structure 
As a first step, the necessary legislative infrastructure for the new border security 
agency under the Ministry of Interior system should be completed. This legislation shall 
authorize the organization and define its duties and powers. Subsequently, Law no. 3497 
on the “Protection and Security of the Land Borders” should be abolished following the 
completion of the transfer of powers and duties related to border security, and a new 
replacement law should be enacted after the transition period. The struggles on the 
amendments to existing laws should comply with EU acquis and practices. Additionally, 
the duties and the powers of the new agency should be similar to the CBP in the U.S. 
Thus, the reform process of the U.S. border security system can be a model for Turkey. 
Second, some amendments should be made to existing legislation. Law no 211 
concerning the internal duties of the Turkish Armed Forces, Law no 5271 on Criminal 
Trial Procedure, Law no 2935 on Emergency State, Law no 2941 Mobilization and State 
of War, Security Organization Code no 3201, Law no. 4926 with regard to the combating 
any types of trafficking, Law no 5442 on Provincial Administrations, Passport Law no 
5682, Law no 5683 concerning travel and residence of foreign subjects in Turkey, Law 
non 6815 on the transfer of competence in the subject of the protection and security of 
land borders, coasts and fluvial areas and the prevention and investigation of trafficking 
to the Ministry of Interior Affairs, and the Regulation on the Protection and Security of 
Land Borders should be reviewed, and new laws and regulations should be enacted and 
implemented where necessary. 
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3. Joint Organizations and Intelligence Cooperation 
The main objective of forming cooperative regional institutions is to establish and 
enhance operational collaboration among the countries of the region. Since one of the 
main duties of the border security agency is law enforcement, it is important to cooperate 
with the regional countries and to make this cooperation permanent by institutionalizing 
it. Moreover, Turkey should be the part of other international border security initiatives. 
To make trade safer and faster, Turkey should become a member of the Cargo Security 
Initiative which was launched by the U.S. after 9/11. The focus of the international 
cooperation should be: 
• the intelligence network between the relevant agencies of the neighboring 
countries 
• the formation of a mobile emergency response team comprised of joint 
forces from collaborating countries 
• the expansion of forgery detection capabilities at the borders 
• the enhancement of the international police cooperation and the trans-
border cooperation with regional countries, 
• the establishment of a regional program for thwarting illegal immigration 
and drug trafficking at the national level so that regional awareness can be 
increased. For example, the U.S. Blue Campaign can give insights about 
the efforts to prevent illegal immigration and drug trafficking. It should be 
reviewed considering the regional dynamics and reconstructed in 
compliance according to the needs of the neighboring countries. The new 
strategy can help to gather the support of local people of the border zones 
in the hands of one institution.139 
Lastly, the Integrated Border Enforcement Teams between the U.S. and Canada, 
and the Alliance to Combat Transnational Threats between the U.S. and Mexico can be 
examined, and necessary parts of these joint initiatives can be adopted by regional 
countries. 
                                                 
139 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Protecting our Borders – This is CBP  
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS ON TECHNOLOGY 
1. The Technology at the Port of Entries 
One of the goals of the border security system is to inspect all entries without 
slowing down the flow of goods and people. Otherwise, heightened security measures 
could affect the trade of Turkey, and this can be harmful to Turkey’s economic 
relationships in the long term. 
First, the entry and exit of the human beings, animals, goods and vehicles should 
be managed at border gates at separate locations. All electronic screening and tracking 
systems and other technical support should be designed and implemented with the 
consideration of protecting efficient passage without sacrificing security? All 
technological arrangements should be established considering this fact. That way the flow 
of the goods and people can be handled properly. For human beings, the following 
electronic tools and technical capabilities can be used for screening purposes that will 
promote safe and streamlined passage: 
• Biometric Identification System  
• Visitor and Immigration Status Indication Technology and Database 
• Fingerprint Identification System which is integrated into national 
database 
• A computerized entry-exit tracking system integrated into National Police 
Database System 
• Electronic system(s) that can separate high-risk travelers from low-risk 
travelers (like the NEXUS, SENTRI, FAST and Easy-pass systems that 
U.S. CBP uses) 
• Technological infrastructure which sustains the cooperation between 
different government agencies by working from the same database 
For vehicles and commercial goods, the following tools can be used to detect 
illegal cargo and WMDs quickly and efficiently: 
• Vehicle and Cargo Inspection Systems 
• X-Ray Vehicles which have mobile inspection capabilities 
• Biological/radiological-particle detectors 
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• Personal radiation detectors 
• High explosives detection systems, and isotope identifiers 
As a result of innovation in the system and equipment, the border security agents 
should be gone through necessary training that that provides them necessary skills to use 
these systems correctly. 
2. Technology at the Border Zones 
Since most of the TF activities occur in the border zones rather than at port of 
entry, special emphasis should be given border zone areas. All relevant technological 
devices should be used in these areas to stop terrorism and of its related trafficking 
activities. Some innovative border surveillance systems in use are: 
• Thermal Hand-Held Imaging Devices 
• Mobile Surveillance System  
• Unattended Ground Sensors  
• Mobile Video Surveillance System  
• Remote Video Surveillance System  
• Night Vision Devices  
• Integrated Fixed Towers  
In addition, UAVs should be used in expansive and harsh border areas. UAVs 
facilitate the monitoring of remote land border areas where border guards cannot easily 
travel. As indicated above, they are very cost-effective for monitoring great distances and 
harsh terrain since infrastructure is difficult or impossible to build in these areas. 
Furthermore, the intelligence collected by these vehicles should be conveyed 
immediately to necessary units to respond quickly to violations along border lines. Thus, 
an Integrated Surveillance Intelligence approach should be adopted to detect, monitor and 
respond to all illegal activities along the borders. Since the PKK mainly uses the routes 
that the smugglers use, this system should be launched the main smuggling routes along 
the land border. Earlier-mentioned custom points of the PKK in Iran border and the 
natural passages between the mountains would be in the center of this system to make 
fighting against financing activities of the PKK more effective. 
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Finally, border agents should take advantage of visualized borders. As in the U.S. 
Border Patrol case, geospatial technology facilitates future predictions in dealing with 
terrorism financing. It gives many details that would be hard to reach by other means. In 
this way, the route of smugglers can be detected very easily, and new measures can be 
adopted accordingly. Computer-based analysis based on pinpointing locations and 
mapping smuggling corridors provides border security institutions a virtual playground 
for predicting illegal immigrant traffic routes and methods. This system might provide 
advantages especially in Iran border since the harsh train does not allow border security 
personnel to figure out the routes of the smugglers. Since the smugglers always change 
their route in very time short time periods, it is hard to keep track of their methods. 
Computer based analysis can help the border security personnel to make future 
predictions and to prevent smuggling or other terrorism financing activities  
C. INTEGRATION WITH LOCAL COMMUNITIES 
The border patrol personnel on border zones work in difficult conditions isolated 
from the local communities. In addition to this isolation, the terrain of the East and 
Southeast land border of Turkey creates challenges to the border protection system. Since 
the PKK uses these tough border lines regularly in financing activities, developing 
relationships with local communities has vital impact on countering TF activities. Living 
conditions in mountain areas are tough. Improving the living conditions of local people in 
these border zones can prevent them from abetting in smuggling activities and encourage 
them to collaborate with security forces. In other words, the government needs to offer 
similar incentives to the ones that the PKK might offer its recruits—jobs, food, etc. 
Dashtseren argues that “the integration of border posts within actions related to the fight 
against poverty alongside the borders could provide a global solution to their 
maintenance in the future.”140 
                                                 
140 Dashtseren, Border Protection and National Security of Mongolia, 82, 91.    
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D. RECOMMENDATIONS ON INTERAGENCY COOPERATION 
Cooperation and coordination among governmental departments is as important 
as the creation of a new border security agency. Currently, the main bodies that deal with 
terrorism-related issues are the National Intelligence Agency (Milli Istihbarat Teskilati), 
Turkish National Police (Emniyet Genel Mudurlugu) and Turkish Gendarmerie 
(Jandarma Teskilati). After the creation of the new border security agency, it will be 
important to coordinate these separate bodies in terms of border security operations. 
Furthermore, the Under Secretariat of Customs has an important role in trade-related 
issues on borders. First of all, since the transfer of duties and powers takes considerable 
time, the existing institutions in charge should continue their duties until the completion 
of the transition process. After transition is complete, a coordination center should be set 
up under the Ministry of the Interior, with the participation of the related commands and 
government bodies.141 In this way, the new organization could utilize the database of old 
institutions related to terrorism cases. 
 
 
                                                 
141 “Towards the Implementation of Turkey’s Integrated Border Management Strategy,” abstract, 53.  
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Today’s terrorist organizations need money not only for funding individual 
attacks but also sustaining the continuity of the organization. Counter financing efforts 
have become a critical issue in countering terrorism after the adoption of the UN 
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. Criminal 
activities, particularly cross-border activities like smuggling and any kind of trafficking 
have been important for financing terrorism. 
Being active for more than 30 years, the PKK has been the part of the violence 
that has taken more than 3,000 lives in Turkey during that time. Even though the fight 
against PKK terrorism has been conducted for as many years, the financing activities that 
support the PKK’s existence could not be prevented until now. The organization has 
settled along the crossroads and borders of Iraq, Iran and Syria. The PKK conducts its 
activities within these three states as well as Turkey and has been successfully exploiting 
Turkey’s geopolitical and geostrategic location for terrorist and organized crime 
activities.  
Turkey’s extensive and geographically tough land border makes it hard to control 
effectively. Significantly, these uncontrolled border areas facilitate PKK control in the 
region and simplify smuggling. This reality has led the PKK to shift its financing 
activities to the border area. There are four main financing activities carried out by the 
PKK along the border areas: human trafficking, drug trafficking and narcotics 
production, illegal trade revenues and taxation and being sponsored by different states. 
Strengthening the security of the border will minimize the main financing activities of the 
PKK.  
Managing border security has grown more puzzling for states due to the increased 
interaction of its private citizens and businesses with neighboring countries stemming 




integration into the global economy. It has been suggested that globalization has harmed 
the sovereignty of states, and it made borders more open and vulnerable to various 
threats.  
To make the borders more secure and to curtail TF activities, we took the U.S. as 
a case study. Since the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. has changed its border security system 
almost completely. Consideration of protecting the country from terrorism without 
sacrificing the economic advantages of globalization has driven the recreation process of 
border security. The use of technology as an integral part of this new border protection 
organism has become a major issue. New departments and agencies have been 
established to secure borders from terrorist or other threats. New policies and programs 
have been put in action to promote international and interagency cooperation in border 
protection. Some of these programs include the Tactical Infrastructure (TI), Export 
Control and Related Border Security Program (EXBS), Customs-Trade Partnership 
Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) and Border Patrol Special Operations Group (SOG). As a 
result, the U.S. case could be an example for Turkey to consider in adopting and 
implementing a new border security policy. 
To stop the financing activities of the PKK along its land borders, Turkey should 
make reforms related to the current border security system. Traditional security practices 
along the borders should be innovatively fitted to modern international standards and new 
technological developments. In this way, it will be more effective in combating the 
financing activities of the PKK along the borders. In an age of globalization, the final 
goal of Turkey’s new border security management should be 1) to develop the tools to 
validate in advance the overwhelming majority of the people and goods that cross the 
border as low risk, or in other words, to facilitate the huge amount of traffic along the 
borders, and simultaneously 2) to enhance the means for agents to target and intercept 
inbound high-risk people and goods such as terrorist and TF activities. 
First of all, Turkey needs to form a new border security agency to stop all PKK 
activities, including financial ones. This study suggests that a civilian, non-military, 
professional single body should be established to be responsible for border management, 
including checks at all ports of entry and border zones. An efficient border protection 
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policy is only possible with an independent professional agency which is comprised of 
highly-trained and well-equipped border protection personnel. This new organization 
should be provided with state-of-the-art technologies for border security purposes and 
strategically placed tactical infrastructure.  
Second, some amendments should be made to existing laws regarding the border 
security system. These legal steps should promote cooperation between relevant agencies, 
and international collaboration should be the key element of new border security 
approach. The new Border Security Agency should form a strong cooperation with the 
other ministries and organizations involved in activities on border-related issues. 
Furthermore, better coordination with other state and local law enforcement organizations 
like Immigration and Customs, National Intelligence and the Police and Gendarmerie 
Department will increase the productivity of border protection operations. In particular, 
integration with the local community of border zones should not be underestimated. 
Considering the number of cross-border activities of the PKK, Turkey should emphasize 
gaining the support of neighboring countries in countering financing activities of the 
PKK. These recommendations, particularly those concerning technology presented in the 
previous chapter, are intended to provide Turkish authorities and leaders with a plan to 
increase collaboration and effectiveness for border security management. 
In implementing these recommendations, Turkey should adopt the system 
approach for better border security management. According to James Jay Carafano, a 
system approach helps us to better understand and solve the border security related issues 
in the long run. This approach could better:142 
• address data management issues  
• provide interoperable communications and information sharing 
• establish closer ties among multiple federal agencies as well as state and 
local governments 
• ensure cooperation between public and private entities 
 
                                                 
142 James Carafano, “Safeguarding America’s Sovereignty: A ‘System of Systems’ Approach to 
Border Security,” Executive Summary Backgrounder, no. 1898 (2005): 5.    
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• allocate scarce resources 
• enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of processes and practices 
The sustained collaboration of all actors at all levels of government with the 
combination of intelligence is the only possible way to secure the land borders of Turkey 
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